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WHEN MAY A RAILROAD COMPANY MAKE
GUARANTIES?
The question of a railroad company's power to make guaran-
ties usually arises upon collateral undertakings of this charac-
ter, written upon the bonds and coupons of another company, in
whose success the guarantor has an interest. The underlying
principles which control the power are common in theory to
private corporations in general. But the volume of railroad
securities is now so great, and their sale so large an element in
the activities of investment, that our discussion need not go
beyond this class of corporations.
The transportation companies are closely allied in business-
the overwhelming tendency of the day is to consolidate lines by
merger, or lease, or traffic contract. A receiver of an extensive
railroad system in the West informed the writer of this article
last Summer that although he had the care of more than a
thousand miles of road, reaching into eight or ten large cities
the principal corporation in his care had no interest of owner-
ship in a terminal station at any one of the large cities. They
were all controlled by lease or traffic contract. The property
under his care was originally owned by ten or more corpora-
tions. This single example, which has exceptional features in
the matter of terminals, is not, on the whole altogether strange
in the history of modern railroad companies. As railroads have
been largely built upon bonds, and as the bonds are constantly
maturing, and are usually renewed in some form or another, it
is to be expected that new parties will be interested in their
renewal, and-so it is every day's experience, that the investing
public is asked to purchase bonds of a railroad company which
are guaranteed for principal'and interest by another corporation.
Two suggestions are worthy of early consideration in exam-
ining the subject: First, the contract of guaranty of negotiable
securities, unless restricted in its terms, is held to be a contract
by the guarantor with the owners of the guaranty. Second, the
general power of guarantying the contracts of one company by
another is held to a less strict limitation in the case of bonds
and coupons than of some other contracts. The reason for this
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distinction in favor of negotiable bonds and coupons is, that rail-
road bonds, payable to bearer, are held both in this country and
England to pass, like bills and notes, free from equities existing
between the original holders. Authorities to this point the
student will find collected at considerable length in Jones on R.
R. Securities, Secs. i97 and x98.
The language of Judge Nelson, in White v. R. R. Co., 21
How. 575, expresses in forcible phraseology, the common result
of intelligent tribunals in this matter. The Supreme Court of
Indiana in R. R. Co. v. Cleneay, 13 Ind. i61, says: "Though
not exactly governed by the law merchant, these bonds are
entitled to the privileges of commercial paper." The negotia-
bility of coupons payable to bearer is even more pronounced
than of the bonds themselves. They are held to possess all the
attributes of negotiable paper. The purchaser acquires title by
delivery, and the promise to bearer is a promise to him directly.
The title passes from hand to hand by mere delivery, and the
transfer of possession is presumably the transfer of title.'
Upon general principles of law a railroad company has no
power to guaranty the contracts of another company, unless
such power is expressly conferred by law, or is incidental to its
corporate character. A leading case in England on this subject
is Coleman v. R. R. Co., io Beav. i. In that case the railroad
company thought it could increase its traffic and profits by the
aid of a steam packet company to be formed and whose vessels
should run from its railroad terminus to the northern parts of
Europe, and they attempted to guaranty five per cent dividends
to the stockholders of the packet company. A shareholder in
the railroad company sought an injunction, and Lord Langdale,
Master of the Rolls, held that no such contract was within the
power of the railroad company. His opinion as to the import-
ance of preserving the property of railroad companies may seem
strange to some readers to-day: "If there is one thing more
desirable than another, after providing for the safety of all per-
sons traveling on railroads, it is this, that the property of a
railroad company shall be itself safe; that a railroad investment
shall not be considered a wild speculation exposing those
engaged in it to all sorts of risk, whether they intended it or
not. Considering the vast property which is now invested in
railroad companies, and how easily it is transferable, perhaps
one of the best things that could happen would be that the
1 See Mercer County v. Hackett, 1st Wal. 83. Ketchum v. Duncan, 96 U. S.
659. Haven v. R. R. Co., iog Mass. 88.
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investment should be of such a safe nature that prudent per-
sons might, without improper hazards, invest their moneys in it.
Quite sure I am that nothing of that kind can be approached, if
railroad companies shall be at liberty to pledge their funds in
support of speculations not authorized by their legal powers, and
might possibly, to say the least, lead to extraordinary losses on
the part o~f the company." This case has been approved by the
United States Supreme Court in Pearce v. R. R. Co., 21 How.
44x, and in Pa. Co. v. R. R. Co., i8 U. S. 290. The case of
Madison Plank Road Co. v. Watertown Co., 7 Wis. 59, held that
the railroad company's guaranty of a loan to the Plank Road
Company, which was in continuation of the railroad company
line, was in excess of the powers of the railroad company. This
case has also been favorably quoted by the Supreme Court of
the United States.2
That the legislative power may be expressed in a private
charter or by general law is conceded by all the cases.
The General Statutes of Connecticut restrict the issue of
guarantees by railroad companies and of course, by implication,
thereby recognize the right as one to be exercised under proper
circumstances and within the statutory limits.
The rule of presumption of legality or illegality has been
several times adjudicated. The leading case is R. R. Co. v.
Howard, 7th Wal. 392. The opinion says: "Private corpora-
tions may borrow money or become parties to negotiable paper
in the transaction of their legitimate business, unless expressly
prohibited; and, unless the contrary is shown, the legal pre-
sumption is, that their acts in that behalf were done in the regu-
lar course of their authorized business. "
The instances in which a railroad company has an implied
power to make such guaranties are commonly found where the
company has acted upon a consideration for its own benefit and
under the general powers of making beneficial contracts within
the lines of its corporate purposes, which is an incident to all
corporate business. Thus a guaranty of this kind is held to be
good where the guarantor owned all the capital stock of the
principal debtor; where the debtor's road was an essential part
of the general system of the guarantor, or was held by the guar-
antor under lease; where the guarantor had advanced the
money in its own interest, and not against legislative prohibi-
tion, to build the road of the debtor company, and the bonds
were used to reimburse them for the money advanced; where
2 See also Transp. Co. v. P. P. Co., 139 U. S. 478.
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the bonds of the debtor company were owned by the guarantor,
and were by it negotiated for the purpose of giving additional
credit to the instrument, and where the consideration of the
negotiation of guaranty was actually received by the guarantor
and appropriated to its own use. Cases supporting these propo-
sitions are many. We give a few of the principal ones.3
Our Connecticut Courts define these incidental powers as
those which are necessary to the use of a corporation's granted
powers. Thus the power to make notes for debts, or to evidence
the consideration of a mortgage of real estate properly pur-
chased, are incidental; the one to the business methods of the
day, and the other to the right of purchasing land. On the
other hand, the same courts hold that making accommodation
paper for another's benefit is ultra vires. The Connecticut
courts include as within the chartered powers of a corporation
those acts which may be exercised within the "fair intent and
purposes of their creation."
The principle of estoppel has been by some eminent tribu-
nals, held to defeat the defense of ultra vires, when made by a
company against a bona fide holder of securities for value. In
the case already cited in the 7th of Wallace the Court says:
"Corporations as much as individuals are bound to good faith
and fair dealing, and the rule is well settled that they cannot,
by their acts, representations or silence, involve others in
onerous engagements, and then turn around and disavow their
acts, and defeat the just expectations which their own conduct
has superinduced."
In the case of Arnott v. R. R. Co., already cited, and
approved by later cases in New York, the Court of Appeals held
that, even if a guaranty were originally an act ultra vires, when
it is transferred for a valuable consideration the defense cannot
be maintained.
The case of Credit Co. v. Howe Machine Co., 54 Conn. 357r
is an important one to our discussion. The defendant, a manu-
facturing company, was limited by its charter, in its ise of
mercf.ntile paper, to the convenient prosecution of its business.
The Treasurer of the company, who was the proper officer to
SZabriskie v. R. R. Co., 23 How. 381. Todd v. Ken. U. Co., 57 Fed.
Rep. 47. Marbury v. Ken. U. Co., 62 Fed. Rep. 35o. Arnott v. Erie R. R.
Co., 67 N. Y. 32r. Rogers Works v. Southern R. R. Assoc., 34 Fed. Rep.
278. Low v. R. R. Co., 9 Am. R. R. 366. Olcott v. R. R., 27 N. Y. 546.
Smith v. Johnson, 3 H. & N. 222. R. R. Co. v. Fletcher, 24 A. & B. R. R.
cases 24.
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make acceptances, accepted accommodation drafts made for the
benefit of a former president. The court estopped the defend-
ant from setting up the claim of ultra vires. If railroad bonds
and coupons are to have the same protection, in the hands of
$onafide holders for value, as notes and bills, the doctrine of
this case would prevent the companies from setting up the
defense. In drawing a distinction between the notice that a
party dealing with a corporation is bound to take of the extent
of its corporate power, and of the circumstances under which
the power is exercised, the opinion says that parties may be
required to take notice of the former, but to require them to
take notice of the latter would frequently result in gross injus-
tice.
It has been claimed that the obligation of a guarantor is to
be strictly confined to the precise terms of his guaranty, and
this principle has been asserted in a number of strong cases.
But it should not be forgotten that the converse of this proposi-
tion has been held by equally good authority-to wit, that a
guaranty is to be construed as strongly against a guarantor as
its terms will admit. The case of Douglas v. Reynolds, 7 Peters
i 13, has been recoguized as a leading case upon the point, and
followed by as many as eight cases in the Supreme Court of the
United States.
In Bank v. Savings Bank, 21 Wal. 294, there was a written
guaranty against shipment of cattle to the extent of $xo,ooo. It
appeared upon the trial that the only cattle shipped were a lot
of hogs, and the guarantor claimed strict privileges, and that
the terms of the guaranty didn't apply to hogs. But the Court
dismissed the defense, and said: "Like all other contracts it
must receive the construction which is most proper and natural
under the circumstances, so as to attain the object which the
parties to it had in making it." And the same court in Davis v.
Wells, 104 U. S. 159, uses significant language when it says that
"the contract of guaranty is to be liberally construed to advance
commercial intercourse."
Questions sometimes arise as to the nature of these guaran-
ties. When the guaranty is attached to the bond and the bond
makes reference to a mortgage which has peculiar provisions
about foreclosure and limitations upon the maker's liability
other than as owner of the property, the claim is set up that the
guaranty is one of collectibility under the terms of the mortgage
and not of payment. It may be fairly said that, if the word
"payment" is used, a court will be reluctant to reduce the con-
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tract from the well-known and important commercial contract
of guaranty of payment to the inferior and uncommercial con-
tract of collectibility. Because the bonds and especially the
coupons are protected by the law merchant, there is justifiable
inclination on the part of courts to hold guarantors, in actions
by bona fide holders for value, to the responsibilities of the ordi-
nary guaranty of payment.
In the case of Security Co. v. Lombard Co., 73 Fed. Rep.
537, Judge Caldwell sustains the legal conclusion of the Master
in Chancery, and fixes the obligation of a guaranty of payment
as a direct and absolute thing upon default by the maker, but
subordinates the right to enforce the guaranty to a period of
two years after default, as specified in the guaranty.
There is a recent case (Louisville Co. v. Ohio Valley Co., 69
Fed. Rep. 431) in which a number of the questions considered
in this article are passed upon. The negotiability of the guar-
anty is sustained in face of a statute which made assignable
obligations subject to equities. The guaranty in this case was
set aside because not authorized by the stockholders. The
directors authorized the execution of the guaranty, and the
stockholders promptly disavowed the action of the directors.
The court held that there was no recital in the bond or
other circumstance in the case which estopped the stockhold-
ers from setting up the invalidity of the guaranty. The statute
provided for railroad guaranties of the bond of other roads, and
that they should be made, at the instance of the stockholders,
by the board of directors. It was claimed in the argument that
other statutes gave the corporation, by implication, authority to
make these guaranties. The court held that the principal
statute was exclusive in its effect, and that no other methods
could be pursued by the corporation. Many authorities are
cited to that point. The case is distinguished from the Za-
briskie case, 23 Howard, already alluded to. It also approves
Justice Swayne's language in Merchants Bank v. State Bank, io
Wal. 604, as to estoppel, but points out the fact that the ques-
tion of ultra vires did not and could not arise in the case.
Henry C. Robinson.
